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The nation finds itself in a rare moment of calm before the storm. On July 1, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor surprisingly announced her inten-
tion to resign upon the nomination and con-
firmation of her successor. The announce-
ment caught everyone off guard, including 
not only her sons but also the White House. 
The prevailing wisdom at the time was that 
if anyone were to resign from the Court at 
the end of the 2004 Term it would be the 
Chief Justice of the United States, William 
Rehnquist, who has been ailing with thy-
roid cancer. Justice O’Connor’s announce-
ment signaled the first vacancy on the Court 
since 1994, the year in which the Senate con-
firmed Justice Stephen Breyer’s nomination 
to replace Harry Blackmun on the Court. As 
such, her announcement marks the begin-
ning of the end of the longest period in more 
than two hundred years without a vacancy 
arising on the Court. Since Justice O’Connor 
has been the swing vote in a number of criti-
cal cases in recent years, the fight over her 
replacement is likely to be as intense as any 
Supreme Court appointment in our his-
tory. Her resignation gives President Bush 
the opportunity to shift the Court’s center 
further to the right, particularly in criminal 
procedure, establishment clause, and gender 
discrimination cases. Given the expectation 
that the Chief Justice will resign sooner rath-
er than later (and maybe in a matter of days 
or weeks), President Bush seems well posi-
tioned and prepared to transform the Court, 
a possibility that is not good news to most 
Democrats.
Though the stakes in replacing Justice 
O’Connor are not lost on anyone, not every-
one in the Senate can claim the same famil-
iarity with the Supreme Court confirmation 
process. A majority of senators – 56 – have 
never participated in a Supreme Court con-
firmation; fewer than half the members of 
the Judiciary Committee have any experi-
ence in dealing with the confirmation of a 
Supreme Court nominee.1 Senate staffers 
are using the brief period of calm between 
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4 0 0 	 8 	 G r e e n 	 B a g 	 2 d 	 3 9 9
	 M i c h a e l 	 J . 	 G e r h a rd t
the announcement of O’Connor’s resigna-
tion and hearings on the President’s choice 
to replace her to educate themselves (and 
their bosses) about the confirmation process, 
including its history.
I suspect that, but for the Green Bag, it 
would have been highly unlikely any but a 
few people would have known about, much 
less had the opportunity to read the tran-
script of, a special hearing of the Senate Sub-
committee on Separation of Powers held in 
1976. The hearing, whose transcript follows, 
focused on the often-ignored role of the Sen-
ate to provide “Advice” on Supreme Court 
appointments.2
The hearing is particularly interesting 
when one contrasts it with another Senate 
subcommittee hearing held 25 years later. 
Both hearings were led by Senate Demo-
crats – James Abourezk of South Dakota in 
1976, and Charles Schumer of New York in 
2001. Senator Abourezk held his hearings in 
the brief interlude between Justice Douglas’s 
announced resignation from the Court and 
President Ford’s nomination of then-Sev-
enth Circuit Judge John Paul Stevens as an 
Associate Justice, while Senator Schumer 
conducted his hearings without the raison 
d’etre of a Supreme Court vacancy.
The most striking difference between the 
hearings, at least in my judgment, has little 
to do with their timing. I am most struck by 
the difference in their focus. In 1976, the ex-
perts primarily focused on qualifications. In 
the 2001 subcommittee hearing, the focus 
was principally on “ideology.” In 1976, the 
experts acknowledged that judicial philoso-
phy was something presidents, and senators, 
might consider. But they did not consider it 
their role to either validate or attack particu-
lar judicial philosophies, and the term “ideol-
ogy” appears nowhere in the hearing. Instead, 
the experts and the senators questioning 
them all looked for higher ground, a higher 
ground on which politics of the highest or-
der would play a recognized part. In 1976, the 
witnesses discussed the characteristics es-
sential to someone meriting appointment to 
the Court. Judicial philosophy received scant 
mention, and no particular ideology was 
labeled as either obligatory or disqualifying 
for the candidate who would replace Justice 
Douglas. In 2001, the experts recognized it as 
inevitable, if not necessary, for confirmation 
proceedings to focus on judicial nominees’ 
likely ideologies.
Yet another interesting difference be-
tween the 1976 and 2001 hearings is that the 
Separation of Powers subcommittee – and 
the experts – tended to focus on different 
parts of the Appointments Clause, which 
provides that the President “shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate, shall appoint … Judges of 
the supreme Court … .” In 1976, the express 
purpose of the subcommittee hearing was 
to explicate the term “Advice,” while in 2001 
the subcommittee’s focus was on the extent 
to which the “Advice and Consent” power 
empowered the Senate to evaluate nominees’ 
judicial philosophies.
What accounts for the quite different 
focuses in 1976 and 2001? No doubt, some 
conservatives, or Republicans, will be quick 
to blame the Democrats for the change in 
focus in judicial confirmation hearings. On 
the one hand, many blame Jimmy Carter, 
who would not become president until Janu-
ary of the next year, for trying to stack the 
lower courts with liberal activists under the 
guise of diversifying the federal judiciary. On 
the other hand, many point to the Senate’s 
 2 Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution states that the President “shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for.”
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rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination to 
the Court as a watershed event in the Su-
preme Court appointments process. They 
argue that it was the Democrats who in 
1987 changed the rules (indeed, some argue 
the Democrats did this again in 2002 when 
they started to filibuster some of President 
Bush’s judicial nominations). As many Re-
publican commentators see it, ideology was 
never, or almost never, an important factor in 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings un-
til Senate Democrats made it so. I am sure 
many commentators will thus greet the 1976 
hearings, conducted by Democrats, as proof 
positive of the absence of ideology as a focus 
of Supreme Court confirmation hearings if 
not the Democrats’ apparent culpability in 
shifting the focus toward ideology.
Democrats have a few interesting re-
sponses. Many will no doubt argue that it 
was President Reagan and the Presidents 
Bush who began to emphasize ideology in 
their nominations to both the lower feder-
al courts and the Supreme Court and thus 
forced the Senate to consider its propriety in 
judicial selection. Bork was not a watershed 
so much as the culmination of a systematic 
effort by the Republicans to stack the courts 
against Roe v. Wade3 and other decisions of 
both the Warren and Burger Courts. Once 
Democrats regained control of the Senate in 
1986, they had the opportunity to keep Presi-
dent Reagan from replacing a swing justice 
– Lewis Powell – with someone clearly dis-
posed to undo or alter Powell’s legacy. The 
1976 hearing helped to make their point: 
Held three years after Roe, it is noteworthy 
that in the hearing that Roe is mentioned 
only once, and even then only obliquely and 
not by name. (Try to imagine a Supreme 
Court confirmation hearing in 2005 in which 
Roe is mentioned a single time!) In 1976, the 
experts all anticipated that presidents would 
make “political” appointments to the Court 
– that they would make Supreme Court ap-
pointments to further their social or political 
agendas. But the experts did not offer com-
mentary on those agendas and the Senators 
questioning them sought none. Rather, the 
experts all saw their task as trying to provide 
counsel to the Senate on how it may provide 
“Advice” to the President to appoint the “best” 
possible person to the Court. Accordingly, 
they went to great lengths to set forth what 
they each considered to be the indicia of a 
meritorious appointment to the Court.
So, who is to blame for an apparent change 
in the focus of Supreme Court confirmation 
hearings? Who is right? I will let you, the 
good reader, decide. I will not try to sway you 
one way or other (even if that were possible). 
Instead, I will make just three observations 
for further consideration. The first is to con-
sider the significance of the 1976 subcommit-
tee’s attempt to construe the powers of the 
Senate over Supreme Court nominations. In 
particular, the senators and experts agreed 
that the term “Advice” in the Appointments 
Clause empowers the Senate to make non-
binding recommendations to the President 
on the criteria he ought to employ in select-
ing Supreme Court nominees. For anyone 
who claims to be a textualist (and that ought 
to be all of us!), each word of the constitu-
tional text is supposed to have meaning, and 
so the word “Advice” in the Appointments 
Clause ought to have a distinct meaning, one 
that it is separate from the term “Consent” in 
the same clause. The question, of course, is 
what is that special meaning. Regardless of 
one’s politics, one ought to recognize that the 
term “Advice” raises the possibility of some 
pre-nomination role that the Senate may per-
form in Supreme Court selection and more 
generally in the federal appointments pro-
cess. It is hardly silly for senators to look for 
 3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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this meaning, though it is not uncommon in 
our history for senators from the President’s 
party to construe the term “Advice” narrowly 
to allow the chief executive more discretion 
in choosing nominees and senators from the 
opposing party to construe the term broadly 
to oblige the President to consider more seri-
ously their recommendations for important 
nominations.
A second, important observation is that, 
in trying to determine the possible differenc-
es between the 1976 and 2001 hearings, we 
have the advantage of knowing how things 
turned out. By this, I do not mean Bork’s re-
jection. I mean Stevens’ nomination, and par-
ticularly how President Ford employed what 
many commentators, then and later, consider 
as a model for appointing a Supreme Court 
justice. After setting forth some basic crite-
ria (including judicial philosophy), President 
Ford delegated the primary responsibility for 
assembling a short-list to his very able Attor-
ney General, Edward Levi. Attorney General 
Levi did a first-rate job. In keeping with his 
efforts then to restore confidence in the Jus-
tice Department in the aftermath of Water-
gate and President Nixon’s resignation, Levi 
worked hard to find the best possible nomi-
nee. That the nominee he found was some-
one whom he knew and who came from the 
very same city in which he had spent most of 
his professional life may have been a coinci-
dence. The Senate greeted the nomination of 
John Paul Stevens with great relief and accla-
mation. He was easily confirmed; and while 
some may argue he has drifted (disturbingly) 
to the left (or that the President should have 
stressed judicial philosophy more heav-
ily in his choice of a nominee), John Paul 
Stevens has been, I believe, a model justice. 
He is by all accounts a person of enormous 
integrity, high intellect, principle (albeit nu-
anced), civility, grace, and independence. Ask 
yourself how willing you would be, operat-
ing behind the infamous Rawlesian veil of 
ignorance without any idea of what cases 
might come before the Court including your 
own, to accept a Justice Stevens. I for one 
have no trouble accepting him as the judge 
of my case without even knowing what the 
issues would be, for I am confident that, as 
his record shows, he will listen carefully to 
the arguments of both sides, and that he will 
not pre-judge the cases coming before him 
but instead will fairly and even-handedly de-
cide them on their facts and the law as he 
has found it. He has been as considerate as 
possible of all legitimate sources of decision. 
Not bad, for a justice, I think. He might not 
have been the “public” person the experts in 
1976 urged the President to select, but he has, 
I think by almost any measure, served his 
country (and its Constitution) well.
Third, of course, we also know how much 
ideology has become the preoccupation with 
those responsible both for choosing and for 
confirming justices. I believe this has been 
a bipartisan preoccupation, for better or 
worse. And, while I am not confident it is a 
good thing, it has been a preoccupation with 
most presidents and most senators. It is no 
accident that at the times of their respec-
tive appointments to the Court all eleven of 
President Washington’s Supreme Court ap-
pointees were well-known Federalists, that 
all five of President Lincoln’s Supreme Court 
appointees had been ardent supporters of 
the Union, and that all nine of President 
Roosevelt’s appointees had long track re-
cords of supporting the constitutionality of 
the New Deal.
The contemporary challenge is to deter-
mine whether it is possible to define merit in 
non-ideological terms. The 1976 hearing is 
remarkable, because the experts did just that. 
I do not know how many experts could do 
that now. The 1976 hearing thus provides a 
significant marker for us. We can measure 
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how far we have come or perhaps how much 
we have deviated from its underlying assump-
tions and expressed understandings. Instead 
of blaming any decline in the appointments 
process on others, perhaps we can ask how 
much President Bush and the Senate is each 
capable of rising to the occasion as I believe 
the President and Senate did in 1976 to join 
in making a genuinely meritorious appoint-
ment.
It would be folly to predict what the future 
holds. It is, however, not too late to learn from 
an interesting moment in our history, though 
I leave it to each reader to decide what les-
son our past, including the hearing, teaches 
us about the Supreme Court, the President’s 
nominating authority, the Senate’s authority 
to provide “Advice,” and of course the Re-
publicans’, Democrats’, and countless interest 
groups’ agendas. If things do not work out 
as we like, I agree with Shakespeare that the 
fault does not lie in the stars.
•
